he universal. About two of these we have spoken; both about the essence and about the substratum, of which we have said that it underlies in two senses, either being a ‘this’-which is the Antonio Rudiger Jersey way in which an animal underlies its attributes-or as the matter underlies the complete reality. The universal also is thought by some to be in the fullest sense a cause, and a principle; therefore let us attack the discussion of this point also. For it Toronto Blue Jays Hattar Sverige seems impossible that any universal term should be the name of a substance. For firstly the substance of each thing is that which is peculiar to it, which does Isco Jersey not belong to anything else; but the universal is common, since that is called universal which is such as to belong to Raul Jimenez Jersey more than one thing. Of which individual then will this be the substance? Either of all or of none; Jan Kirchhoff Jersey but it cannot be the substance of all. And if it is to be the substance of one, this one will be the others Javier Hernandez Jersey also; for things whose substance is one and whose essence is one are themselves also one.
Further, substance means that which is not predicable of a subject, but the universal is predicable of some subject always.
But perhaps the universal, while it cannot be substance in the way in which the essence is so, can be present in this; e.g. ‘animal’ can be present in ‘man’ and ‘horse’. Then clearly it is a formula of the essence. Belgium Drakt And it makes no difference even if it is not a formula of everything that is in the substance; for none the less the Leonardo Bonucci Jersey universal Ireland Drakt will be the substance of something, as ‘man’ Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain Jersey is the substance of the individual man in whom it is present, so that the same result will follow once more; for the universal, e.g. ‘animal’, will be the substance Stefano Sturaro Jersey of that in which it is present as something peculiar to it. And further it is impossible and absurd that the ‘this’, i.e. the substance, if it consists of parts, should not consist of substances nor of what is a ‘this’, but of quality; for that which is not substance, i.e. the quality, will then be prior to substance and to the ‘this’. Which is impossible; for neither in formula nor in time nor in coming to be can the modifications be prior to the substance; for then they will also be separable from it. Further, Socrates will contain a substance present in a substance, so that this will be the substance of two things. And in general it follows, if man and such things are substance, that none of the elements in their formulae is the substance of anything, nor does it exist apart from the species or in anything else; I mean, for instance, that no ‘animal’ exists apart from the particular kinds of animal, nor does any other of the elements present in formulae exist apart.
If, then, we view the matter from these standpoints, it is plain that no universal attribute is a substance, and this is plain also from the fact AFC Fiorentina Drakter that no common predicate indicates a ‘this’, but rather a ‘such’. If not, many difficulties follow and especially the ‘third man’.
The conclusion is evident also from the following colinks:
http://www13.plala.or.jp/white_roots/gwbbs/gwbbs.cgi
http://www13.plala.or.jp/white_roots/gwbbs/gwbbs.cgi
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