nsideration. A substance cannot consist of substances present in it in complete reality; for things that are thus in complete reality two are never in complete reality one, though if they are potentially two, they can be one (e.g. the double line consists of two halves-potentially; for the Landon Donovan Jersey complete realization of the halves divides them from one another); therefore if the substance is one, it will not consist of substances present in it and present in this way, which Democritus describes rightly; he says one thing cannot be made out of two nor two out of one; for he identifies substances with his indivisible magnitudes. It is clear therefore that the same Medhi Benatia Jersey will hold good of number, if number is a synthesis of units, as is said by some; for two is either not one, or Monaco Fodboldtrøjer there is no unit present in it in complete reality. But our result involves a difficulty. If no substance can consist of universals because a universal AFC Ajax Tröja indicates a ‘such’, not a ‘this’, and if no substance can be composed of substances existing in complete reality, every substance would be incomposite, so that there would not even be a Alberto Moreno Jersey formula Män Knitwear of any substance. But it is thought by all and was stated long ago that it is either only, or primarily, substance that can defined; yet now it seems that not even substance can. There cannot, then, be a definition of anything; or in a sense there can be, and in a sense there cannot. And what we are saying will be plainer from what follows.
Book VII Chapter 14
It is St. Louis Cardinals Hattar clear also from these very facts what consequence confronts those who say the Ideas are substances capable of separate existence, and at the same time make the Form consist of the genus and the differentiae. For if the Forms exist and ‘animal’ is present in ‘man’ england Tröja and ‘horse’, it is either one and the same in number, or different. (In formula it is clearly one; for he who states the formula will Män Ralph Lauren Polo go through the formula in either case.) If then there is a ‘man-in-himself’ who is a ‘this’ and exists apart, the parts also of which he consists, e.g. ‘animal’ and ‘two-footed’, must indicate ‘thises’, and be capable of separate existence, and substances; therefore ‘animal’, as well as ‘man’, must be of this sort.
Now (1) if the ‘animal’ in ‘the horse’ and in ‘man’ is one and the Aston Villa Dame same, as you are with yourself, (a) how will the one Davide Santon Jersey in things that exist apart be one, and how will this ‘animal’ escape being divided even from itself?
Further, (b) if it is to share in ‘two-footed’ and ‘many-footed’, an impossible conclusion follows; for contrary attributes will belong at the same time to it although it is one and a ‘this’. If it is not to Yerry Mina Jersey share in them, what is the relation implied when one says the animal is two-footed or possessed of feet? But perhaps the two things are ‘put together’ and are ‘in contact’, or are ‘mixed’. Yet all these expressions are absurd.
But (2) suppose the Form to be different in each species. Then there will be practically an infinite number of tlinks:
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